The Threat of Annexation of Belarus: Assessing Risks and Perspectives
- EESF
- Mar 20
- 12 min read
Updated: Apr 9
1. The crux of the matter
As of March 2025, the issue of possible annexation of Belarus by Russia, including the use of military force, has attracted considerable attention. The argument behind it is that a "victory" over Belarus will serve as some kind of compensation for Moscow's failures in Ukraine. In this regard, the Russian generals allegedly "are already actively discussing with their Belarusian colleagues behind Lukashenko's back the scenario of the full incorporation of Belarus into the Russian Federation".
Another argument, according to the experts of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), is that the full occupation of Belarus is necessary for Russia to prepare for armed aggression against one of the European countries. One of the leaders of the Belarusian systemic opposition, Sviatlana Tikhanouskaya, stated the same speaking at the Council of Europe on 12 March. In her opinion Belarus has already become a military bridgehead of the Russian Federation and can become a "consolation prize" in case of Russia's defeat in Ukraine.
We agree that it is practically impossible for Russia to carry out any aggressive actions against any EU country without the involvement of Belarus. However, the likelihood of Moscow occupying and annexing Belarus in the near future seems low. The reasons for such a conclusion lie in both political and military planes.
Below we will take a closer look at the reasons and probability of peaceful or forceful (through military occupation) annexation of Belarus by Russia, as well as possible risks for Moscow in case these plans are realised.
2. Russia's threat to the EU
At present, Russia has land borders with six EU countries that are simultaneously members of NATO: Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland (the Kaliningrad enclave) in the western and north-western directions. It makes little sense for Russia to launch an offensive against Norway and Finland due to the lack of clear strategic goals and difficult natural and climatic conditions. Poland’s strong military makes it a formidable foe. Occupying it quickly is nearly impossible, risking another prolonged conflict Russia is unprepared for.
The prospects for the occupation of the Baltics look different. First, the Russian leadership considers the collapse of the Soviet Union a huge mistake and dreams of reviving a "socialist empire". Second, the seizure of the Baltics means additional ports in the Baltic Sea. Third, the annexation of Lithuania will make it possible to unblock the Kaliningrad enclave, providing a reliable land transport corridor. In other words, by conducting an offensive operation and annexing Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia according to the "Ukrainian scenario", Russia gains significant political and economic benefits, while relying on a significant ideological basis: the idea of reviving USSR is supported by a significant number of Russians. Militarily, this operation appears straightforward, given the vast disparity in forces.
However, there are also a sufficient number of constraints.
It makes little sense to occupy any one of the Baltic States; all three should be seized. Consequently, a significant military contingent must be deployed both to conduct combat operations and to hold the captured territories.
It is practically impossible to conduct a full-scale offensive operation against Lithuania from the Kaliningrad bridgehead (the only section of Russia's land border with this country). Consequently, it is mandatory to use the territory of Belarus as a convenient bridgehead for the creation of strike groups and accumulation of troop reserves.
The strongest deterrent is the Baltic states’ NATO membership. Even after the bloc's demonstration of outright weakness and indecisiveness in confronting Russia in Ukraine, it remains a big question whether Moscow will want to test the willingness of the 32 NATO countries to comply with Article 5 of the organisation's Charter, which guarantees the common support of all states in case of aggression against any member of the alliance.
German military expert Carlo Masala rightly points out that an "intermediate" option is also possible, in which Russia would not immediately start a major European war, but would limit itself to occupying one town, such as Narva in Estonia, with a high percentage of Russian-speaking population under the pretext of protecting their rights. In case NATO countries do not deem it worth sending their soldiers to die for the sake of "some insignificant town on the edge of Europe", it can be considered a defeat and the collapse of NATO with minimal losses on the part of Russia. We consider this scenario quite realistic, but it should be noted that even in this case of "psychological attack" Russia should be ready that Article 5 will be triggered and the war will start, and this again means the necessity to prepare in advance the territory of Belarus as a bridgehead for the creation of strike groups and accumulation of troop reserves. If even a part of NATO countries (e.g. Poland and Northern European countries) will resist Russia's military aggression, confining operations to Estonia would prove ineffective for Moscow.
3. "Belarusian factor" in Russia's military plans
Thus, the Baltic States are a likely target of Russian aggression, with Belarus playing a central role in Moscow’s military strategy. A bridgehead in Belarus gives Russia the following key advantages:
The "Belarusian bulge" is ideally positioned to strike Lithuania and Latvia, isolating the Baltic republics from NATO land supply routes via the Suvalki Gap.
· "Belarus provides ample resources to deploy large offensive forces, coordinate units and subunits, and supply them with food, materials, and equipment during preparations.
Units and detachments of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus can secure the state border during the preparatory period and the rear areas during the strike.
· Belarus has extensive military and transport infrastructure essential for deploying and supplying troop groups.
However, the Republic of Belarus is a de jure independent sovereign state. Therefore, the elimination of obstacles on the part of the Belarusian military and political leadership for the implementation of the Kremlin's aggressive plans is of paramount importance.
Would Belarusian authorities agree to act as a co-aggressor again, this time against EU and NATO states? How might Moscow transform Belarus into a launchpad for aggression against the West?
4. Assessing the feasibility of possible annexation plans: the military dimension
Efforts to answer this question have spawned various scenarios, including conspiracy theories, about how Moscow might seize control of Belarus.
The most popular scenario, as noted earlier, involves a forced power shift in Minsk and annexation of Belarus through military occupation, disguised as participation in the Zapad-2025 exercises scheduled for September 2025.
In this scenario, Lukashenko, intimidated by a large Russian troop presence in Belarus, would cede power to a Moscow-controlled figure who would then rush a referendum on Belarus’s incorporation into Russia.
In our opinion, this version does not take into account a number of important factors.
Lukashenko has ruled Belarus harshly for 30 years, and his seventh-term candidacy and 'decisive' election win show his unwillingness to relinquish power.
Meanwhile, Moscow definitely made such a condition by providing Lukashenko with its support during the 2020 protests. Moreover, Lukashenko has prevented the rise of a strong pro-Russian party in Belarus, unlike the more independent, pro-Western Ukraine, Georgia, and Armenia.
Lukashenko's character will force him to fight for power to the end. Given his near-total control over the state’s military and security forces – he personally approves every officer promotion from colonel upward – any Russian attempt to seize control would face fierce resistance. There will be no silent transition of the Belarusian security forces under the new banners. Additionally, the Zapad-2025 exercise will involve a modest contingent – up to 10,000 troops – far too few to occupy and hold Belarus’s key regions. If Moscow wants to increase its contingent, it will not be able to do so without Lukashenko's consent.
Moreover, despite his pro-Russian and anti-Western rhetoric, A. Lukashenko clearly understands where the main threats to his power come from and takes appropriate steps. Analysis of Belarusian regional budgets from 2022 to 2025, under 'National Defence: Mobilization Training and Mobilization' (hereafter, defence expenditures), suggests that Minsk views the primary security threat as coming from the east – namely, Russia.
This is shown by the Mogilev region, in eastern Belarus with no direct borders to Ukraine or NATO states, having the highest defence expenditures over four years (see figure and Diagram 1):
A comparative analysis of defence spending in regions bordering NATO (Brest, Grodno, Vitebsk), Ukraine (Brest, Gomel), and Russia (Vitebsk, Gomel, Mogilev) offers striking insights (see Diagram 2):
Finally, Diagram 3 shows total differences in defence spending between 2022 and 2025:
Given the Belarusian government’s strict secrecy, it’s impossible to determine precisely how funds under the regional budget item 'National Defence: Provision of Mobilization Training and Mobilization' were used. Nevertheless, Belarusian regions bordering Russia have clearly been preparing for combat on their soil over the past three years.
Thus, Moscow may be compelled to launch full-scale aggression against Belarus, an action unlikely to gain support from Russian or Belarusian society and one that could undermine the Kremlin’s broader plans for Europe, especially the Baltics.
Consider Crimea: despite a majority (over 50%) identifying as Russian, over half (Russians and Ukrainians) expecting economic gains from annexation, and Russia’s strong naval base in Sevastopol, the peninsula’s seizure – from hostilities starting February 20 to formal annexation on March 18, 2014– took 27 days.
In largely mono-ethnic Belarus, where citizens—despite Russian propaganda—favor alliance over absorption, any military operation would encounter even stiffer challenges.
To launch and sustain a full-scale invasion of even one of these European countries, neither the 13,000 troops planned for Zapad-2025 nor the 30,000 deployed in the northern sector against Ukraine in February 2022 would suffice.
Moreover, to achieve its aims against the Baltic states – even via the 'intermediate option' outlined earlier – the Kremlin must be ready to execute a swift offensive across multiple fronts.
Thus, sufficient offensive and strike groups must be pre-positioned near the intended battlefields. These groups would require tens of thousands of troops, thousands of combat vehicles, and hundreds of strike assets. Such preparations cannot be concealed or executed swiftly in today’s environment. The international community and Kyiv clearly tracked the buildup of nearly 200,000 Russian troops along Ukraine’s borders – including 30,000 in Belarus – in late 2021 and early 2022.
In this scenario, the EU and NATO would have ample time to counter Russian aggression, even as Moscow forcibly occupies regional capitals and seizes military bases, negating any element of surprise.
Furthermore, Russia currently lacks sufficient trained troops, with nearly its entire army engaged in Ukraine. Redeploying these forces to Belarus’s border would require first securing a peace deal with Ukraine, followed by a massive logistical effort under global scrutiny. While feasible, this approach is militarily inefficient.
5. Assessing the feasibility of possible annexation plans: the political dimension
To gauge the likelihood of Belarus’s forced annexation by Russia, we must consider not only military advantages, but also political drawbacks for Moscow.
As of March 2025, Belarus exemplifies integration with Russia, serving as a model for potential future members of a revived Russian empire. During talks with Lukashenko in Moscow on March 13, 2025, Putin described Belarusian-Russian relations as follows: “Our ties are evolving to set an example for other nations in economic and security spheres, as well as in international cooperation”. A military occupation of Belarus would undermine this image and waste Russia’s long-term, costly efforts in this area.
Thus, it would be more strategic for Moscow to politically pressure Lukashenko to step down during the next elections and align his successor with Russian leadership. This would allow Moscow to finalise integration programs stalled by Lukashenko, adopt the Russian ruble as a shared currency, establish supranational bodies, and gradually familiarize Belarusians with this new reality.
The only condition that Moscow needs for this plan to succeed is the presence in Minsk of a conditionally legitimate but controllable leader who follows instructions from the Kremlin.
Given this, turning Belarusians into active foes through reckless actions would be futile and counterproductive for Russia.
This analysis indicates that Russia is unlikely to annex Belarus soon, and a military threat from Belarus is not imminent. Preparation for aggression will take Russia a lot of time, cannot go unnoticed and will cause a harsh reaction of the Belarusian leadership. In this regard, it seems much more promising for Russia to build up hybrid pressure on the EU and NATO in order to achieve an internal conflict and destruction of both international organisations. At the same time, the military threat will serve as a part of this hybrid war.
6. The meaning of rhetorical escalation in the Belarusian context
These conclusions prompt a reevaluation of the aggressive rhetoric of Russian and Belarusian officials and propagandists, as well as frequent 'leaks' of information about looming threats, which are increasingly reported by the Belarusian and, more recently, increasingly by the Russian opposition.
We view this as part of a sustained psychological and informational campaign by Russian and Belarusian authorities to end the international isolation of their regimes.
This operation unfolds from summer 2024 and includes the following directions and stages:
Phase 1: Belarus
Starting from July-August 2024, Lukashenko shifts his rhetoric, sending ambiguous signals to the West. He frequently emphasizes deeper military and technical ties with Russia, including tactical nuclear weapons, Oreshnik missile deployments (initially ten, later two), and a security treaty with Moscow. On the other hand, he personally and his representatives constantly emphasise their readiness to negotiate with the West. This is a classic tactic of both Lukashenko and Putin, the so-called "escalation for de-escalation". Lukashenko thus warns the West that if it does not negotiate with him, it will get worse. Notably, all calls for dialogue are public, made with Russia’s awareness yet without its response, signaling a coordinated effort.
Phase 1: Russia
Russia has been actively supporting Lukashenko's rhetoric in its escalation part for six months. This happens even against the background of the economic and political disagreements between Minsk and Moscow, which have intensified recently.
Phase 2: Belarus
Starting again from July-August 2024, the influence of a new wing in the Belarusian opposition abroad is rapidly growing, which advocates negotiations with Lukashenko in order to exchange political prisoners for sanctions without any preconditions. According to our information, representatives of the Belarusian authorities are in regular contact with this group.
Phase 2: Russia
From the moment first secret, then explicit negotiations between the US and Russia ( via Kirill Dmitriev's backchannel) begin, Lukashenko joins, aiding prisoner exchanges and starting a dialogue with the Trump administration.
Phase 3: Belarus – US
Soon after, Elon Musk’s influencer Mario Nawfal conducts a highly laudatory interview with Lukashenko, amplified on X.
Two notable articles – It's Time to Roll Back Sanctions on Putin's Ally in Belarus the (31.01.) and Under Russia's deepening shadow, Belarus tries to maintain its balancing act (16.03) – appear in the U.S. The main message of both articles is that Lukashenko does not want to be integrated into Russia, but it will happen if he does not get a helping hand. The Washington Post article is especially interesting, as its reporters freely visit Belarus and interview Belarusians, including representatives of the authorities. Anyone who is familiar with the situation in Belarus knows that this is simply impossible without the direct authorisation of the Belarusian leadership.
Phase 4: Belarus – EU
These efforts falter on the primary front—the European track. Therefore, "leaks" about "secret negotiations between Belarusian and Russian generals behind Lukashenko's back" appear. Again, an absolutely unreal situation, as the Belarusian security services are fully subordinated to Lukashenko and constantly control both the military and each other. The offices of senior officials are widely understood to be monitored, and Lukashenko often reminds subordinates privately that he hears their every word.
At the same time, the Belarusian opposition reinforces this message to Lukashenko based on its own interests. The "hawks" want to achieve increased pressure on Lukashenko, while the "doves", on the contrary, are interested in negotiations.
All this is being done for one purpose: to force the EU or certain EU countries to enter into negotiations on lifting the most painful sanctions against Belarus. This issue is extremely important not only for Belarus, but also for Russia.
First, any lifting of sanctions on Belarus legitimises Lukashenko, gives him the opportunity to have closer contacts with the West and act as a mediator between the EU and Russia. Moreover, after the lifting of sanctions on Belarus, the question of lifting sanctions on Russia will inevitably arise.
Second, lifting sanctions on Belarus will immediately turn it into a powerful hub for smuggling any necessary industrial goods and technologies to Russia.
Third, it will significantly strengthen the domestic political positions of both Lukashenko and Putin, who will once again demonstrate to their entourage their strength and weakness of the West.
7. Our conclusions and recommendations
This analysis leads to the following conclusions:
Further informational and psychological pressure on the EU is inevitable to stoke panic and push for security guarantees from Lukashenko against Russian annexation.
These “guarantees” are meaningless, as Lukashenko has no interest in annexation and will resist it regardless.
The Russian leadership is well aware of this. Additionally, if Putin escalates beyond rhetoric and minor troop maneuvers into a reckless annexation bid, Lukashenko couldn’t stop him, but Russia would face a slow, difficult conflict, giving the West ample preparation time.
Both Lukashenko and Putin need negotiations at the moment for completely different reasons, related to breaking the isolation and lifting sanctions. Therefore, this information and psychological operation is being carried out jointly by them.
In the future, the US media and politicians, as well as part of the Belarusian and Russian opposition, may join these attempts for the reasons mentioned above.
The best short-term response is deterrence, a unified EU stance against Russian and Belarusian military-political blackmail, and effective countermeasures to informational attacks, especially on social media.
In the medium- and long-term perspectives, a new joint Eastern policy should clearly distinguish between Belarus and Russia, prioritizing EU security interests over those of the Belarusian or Russian opposition. It is precisely such a policy that will ultimately bring maximum benefit to both the EU and the peoples of Belarus and Russia.