Presidential Elections 2025 in the Republic of Belarus: specifics and nuances
- EESF
- Feb 8
- 17 min read
Updated: Mar 12
1. Introduction
On 26 January 2025, the main voting took place at the presidential election of the Republic of Belarus. The incumbent president A. Lukashenko, who has been leading the country for the last 30 years and is not recognised by the West as the legitimate leader of the country after the 2020 protests, won with a huge margin of victory (as expected).
Although this is already the seventh consecutive presidential election in which A. Lukashenko is running, it differs significantly from all the previous ones.
The recent election campaign took place in new, unprecedented conditions for the country and required the incumbent president and his entourage to make unconventional moves not only to ensure the necessary voting results, but also to keep the society under control during this critical period for the authorities.
Below we offer a detailed analysis of these moves, as well as some conclusions regarding Lukashenko's post-election policy.
2. Temporary structure of the presidential election in 2025
The election campaign that took place in Belarus can be divided into five stages:
Stage 1: Setting the date of the election, registration of initiative groups, approval of the schedule of relevant activities and determination of the timeframe of the election campaign (23 October – 1 November 2024).
Stage 2: Formation and approval of initiative groups to nominate presidential candidates, formation of territorial commissions (2–6 November 2024).
Stage 3: Collection of signatures in support of candidates, submission of documents to the CEC, candidate registration (7 November – 31 December 2024).
Stage 4: Active phase of advertising and promotional activities (1 January – 25 January 2025).
Stage 5: Early and main voting (21–26 January 2025). This phase partially overlaps with the previous one due to the fact that campaigning does not stop during early voting.
3. Analysis of the first phase (23 October – 1 November 2024)
Appointment of the election date – registration of initiative groups – approval of the schedule of events and determination of the electoral campaign timeframe
On 23 October the House of Representatives of the Republic of Belarus adopted decision on the proposal of the Central Election Commission (CEC) to hold the next presidential election on 26 January 2025.
The vague explanation of this unexpectedly early date[1] together with the obviously unplanned nature of its adoption (in the weekly and monthly schedule of the lower house of parliament, a session on 23 October was not planned[2], many deputies went on trips) indicates the desire of the Belarusian authorities to conduct the election campaign exclusively according to their own scenario. Unlike in 2020, preparations for the presidential election started well in advance and in accordance with the plans developed in the Presidential Administration of Belarus by a special working group headed by Natalia Petkevich, who was brought back to the Belarusian political establishment for this purpose by A. Lukashenko (after a 10-year break, Petkevich was appointed First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration in June 2024[3]).
The subsequent course of events confirmed that this decision was not spontaneous – the state authorities had made high-quality preparations for the election campaign and kept the date of the election secret from the general public until the last moment. Thanks to this, Lukashenko managed to take his opponents both in the opposition and in Moscow by surprise with an unexpectedly early date and a very narrow time window for preparing for the elections – from 23.10.2024 to 26.01.2025.
At the same time, the choice of the BRICS summit taking place in Russia on 22-24 October as a public platform for Lukashenko's statement about his participation in the presidential election in Belarus is noteworthy. It allowed Lukashenko to draw additional attention to this fact, as well as to convey his position on international issues (which could already be considered as an integral part of his election programme) to relevant target groups.
On 24 October, the CEC approved the schedule for the presidential election, which proved to be very tight due to the sudden announcement of the date of the election. Documents on the registration of initiative groups to collect signatures for nomination of candidates had to be submitted by 1 November (i.e. candidates were given only six working days to prepare). One month – from 7 November to 6 December – was given to collect signatures for nomination as presidential candidates. At the same time, 153 territorial commissions and more than 5 thousand precinct commissions had to be formed within three months to organise the elections[4].
There is no doubt that this decision of the Belarusian parliament was sudden only for the general public, but not for A. Lukashenko's election HQ. Thus, on the day the date of the presidential election was announced, the National Library has already hosted a meeting of the HQ of the “Patriotic Forces of Belarus” (an association of pro-governmental public organisations), which discussed the strategy and tactics of their activities during the election campaign[5].
It is also noteworthy that the Kremlin publicly supported Lukashenko's decision to run for a new presidential term through its propagandist Skabeeva.
The main features of the first phase of the campaign were:
the unexpected choice of the election date for the general public,
a difficult timeframe for possible opponents (opposition, Kremlin) to fit in and to influence the election campaign,
use of an important international platform for Lukashenko to announce his participation in the presidential election in Belarus,
readiness of the power vertical to act under conditions of temporary time pressure,
Moscow's support for Lukashenko's decision to run for the presidency.
4. Analysis of the second phase (2–6 November)
Formation and registration of initiative groups to nominate presidential candidates
By 1 November, applications for registration of initiative groups of 11 candidates had been submitted to the CEC, of which seven were approved:
- A. Lukashenko (the current President of Belarus);
- O. Gaidukevich (leader of the Liberal Democratic Party);
- A. Khizhnyak (leader of the Republican Party of Labour and Justice, deputy of the Minsk City Council and director of the Research Design Institute of Urban Planning);
- O. Chemodanova (head of the main department of ideological work and youth affairs of Minsk Сity Executive Committee, ex-head of the press service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs);
- A. Kanopatskaya (businesswoman, ex-candidate in 2020);
- S. Bobrikov (head of the Republican Council of the Belarusian Officers' Union, former member of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly and former head of the Belarusian Military Academy);
- S. Syrankov (leader of the Communist Party of Belarus).
The registration of initiative groups of the following candidates was denied for various reasons, including irregularities in the submission of documents:
- Y. Gubarevich (leader of the movement "For Svaboda", ex-candidate in 2020);
- A. Drozdov (no information on the candidate);
- D. Kovaleva (a former businesswoman who rented out accommodation);
- В. Kulesh (no information on the candidate is available).
It is noteworthy that A. Lukashenko, commenting on the submission of applications to the CEC of "alternative candidates", confessed that these candidates go to the elections because they want to "secure" him. "I'm sure they just want to flank me here and secure me. No more, no less," the politician said. At the same time, when asked "Are you in danger?" after a short pause, Lukashenko replied that "if there is <danger>, we haven't discovered it yet."[6] .
In order to justify the necessity of A. Lukashenko's participation in the next elections against the background of registration of initiative groups of candidates, the press service of the president conducted a PR-action "NADO!" unprecedented for Belarus in terms of forms and scales. Under the control of the ideological vertical, video clips were recorded all over the country in which various groups and categories of Belarusian citizens declared the necessity for the incumbent president to run for office in the upcoming elections.
The main features of the second phase of the campaign were:
registration of initiative groups in support of only those candidates who are fully controlled by the authorities and whose participation should demonstrate a huge gap of "people's trust" between them and A. Lukashenko,
registration of the initiative group of the representative of the "constructive opposition" A. Kanopatskaya (former presidential candidate in 2020) and refusal to register the initiative group of “not so constructive” Y. Gubarevich,
registration of initiative groups of candidates from three out of four parties allowed in Belarus. At the same time, the most numerous party, “Belaya Rus”, declared its unconditional support of the incumbent president, despite the fact that A. Lukashenko has always been and remains an independent candidate,
use by the authorities of non-standard forms and methods of work with the electorate (allegedly spontaneous flash mobs and special actions in social networks).
5. Analysis of the third phase (7 November – 31 December 2024)
Collection of signatures in support of candidates - submission of documents to the CEC -
candidate registration
Already five days after the start of signature collection, S. Bobrikov and O. Chemodanova withdraw their candidacies[7],[8]. It can be assumed that the surprisingly fast and synchronous withdrawal of the two candidates from pro-governmental organisations was an attempt to eliminate the miscalculation of Lukashenko’s team, caused by an overly strong desire to demonstrate the democratic nature of the upcoming elections. The fact is that although both candidates do not have any political weight of their own, they represent influential GONGOs (Government-Organised Non-Governmental Organisations), i.e. nominally non-governmental public organisations, established on the initiative or with the participation of the authorities and working for the interests of the state.
The Belarusian Union of Officers (BUO) counts more than 13 thousand officers[9]. The Belarusian Union of Women (BUW) is the largest women's organisation in the country and unites more than 162 thousand women[10]. The nomination of presidential candidates from these organisations assumes that they will be actively supported by the BUO and the BUW. Thus, quite unexpectedly, at the initiative of Lukashenko's HQ, a split emerged among the forces loyal to him, which had to be quickly eliminated.
In the current campaign, unlike the previous elections, the authorities launched in advance an unprecedented campaign of advertising A. Lukashenko, aimed at forming the opinion among the citizens of Belarus that there is no worthy alternative to him.
In particular, the state media published materials about pickets and the process of collecting signatures exclusively in favour of Lukashenko, "forgetting" about other candidates. A similar situation was observed with regard to the funds received by the election funds of possible candidates. According to the CEC, as of 13 November the election fund of A. Lukashenko received Br427240. The fund of O. Gaidukevich – Br200. The funds of the other four participants admitted to the election campaign were empty at that time[11].
Already two weeks after the beginning of signature collection, on 21 November, the head of the initiative group of the incumbent president Y. Senko reported to A. Lukashenko that more than 1,5 million signatures had already been collected for his nomination as a presidential candidate[12].
It took a direct order from Lukashenko himself for the state media to start covering other candidates. During the meeting with the members of his initiative group on 21 November he set the task "not to forget about his electoral competitors". On the same day the state media published relevant materials, promptly reacting to the remark of the incumbent president. And two days later the state TV channel "Belarus 1" issued a big report, which, among other things, covered the collection of signatures by other candidates[13].
On 6 December, the collection of signatures in support of the nomination of presidential candidates was completed. According to the CEC chairperson I. Karpenko, this stage was peaceful – no complaints or appeals were received.
By 17 December, all contenders had submitted documents for registration as a presidential candidate[14].
On 23 December, the CEC announced the registration of five presidential candidates and published the number of signatures collected in their support[15]:
- A. Lukashenko (2 518 145 signatures),
- O. Gaidukevich (134 472),
- S. Syrankova (125 577),
- A. Kanopatskaya (120 077),
-А. Hizhnyak (112 779).
At the same time, although Lukashenko's election headquarters announced about the allegedly collected 2,5 million signatures for his presidential nomination, there are reasonable doubts both about the authenticity of the record number of signatures (at least 30% of the number of voters) and about the adequacy of their verification.
A properly executed signature sheet contains up to 18 signatures[16]. Consequently, 2,5 million signatures require 138 900 A4 sheets or 280 packages of printed paper weighing 0,7 tonnes. The CEC had only five days (including two days off) to check the validity of the collected signatures in support of Lukashenko alone: the documents were submitted on 17 December.
Such a short timeframe casts doubt on the possibility of adequate verification of the submitted information and may be evidence of falsification by the authorities at the stage of collecting signatures in support of candidates.
In addition, an analysis of the information on collected signatures by region shows that in Grodno region 36,3 per cent of the total population living in the region, including children and adolescents, or about 47 per cent of the number of voters, signed in support of Lukashenko[17]. In Mogilev region these figures were 41.4 per cent and about 50 per cent respectively[18]. At the same time, the total number of signatures collected in favour of the other four candidates is 16,81% in Mogilev region and 17,78% in Grodno region of the signatures registered in support of the incumbent president:
According to the plan of the Presidential Administration, the uniquely high figures of collected signatures in support of candidates (about 50% of the total number of voters) should, firstly, show a high level of public involvement in the election campaign, and secondly, prepare the ground for Lukashenko's convincing victory. However, the almost equal ratio of allegedly collected signatures for all candidates across the regions (a statistical anomaly) makes one doubt the reality of the announced figures.
Thus, the main features of the third phase of the campaign were:
a record number of signatures collected in favour of Lukashenko,
quick reaction of Lukashenko's election HQ to the shortcomings of the authorities with regard to the election campaign.
6. Analysis of the fourth phase (1 January – 25 January 2025)
The active phase of advertising and promotional activities - presentation of election programmes
From the very beginning of the election process, which started on 23 October 2024, A. Lukashenko was in a better position than other candidates in terms of campaigning in support of his candidacy.
And while in 2020 he consciously avoided mass events, in 2024 he personally attended the harvest festivals "Dazhynki-2024" in all six regions of Belarus in a month and a half (from 5 October to 16 November 2024). It is noteworthy that the politician's speeches at these events were characterised by balance, absence of aggressive rhetoric and empty promises, as well as a large number of compliments to the residents of the regions.
First of all, this is explained by the fact that Lukashenko's election headquarters, as in the 1990s, considered rural residents, who number about two million people in Belarus, as the main electoral base of the incumbent president. This is also favoured by the strong dependence of rural residents on local officials.
Hidden agitation for the incumbent president was also massively carried out during the social and cultural action "Marathon of Unity", which started on 17 September 2025 and took place in 15 largest cities of Belarus and ended with the final concert in Minsk on 24 January. This action turned into an advertisement of the achievements of the state under the leadership of A. Lukashenko, for which huge resources of the state, in particular ministries (culture, information, antimonopoly regulation and trade, sports and tourism), Minsk City Executive Committee, regional executive committees, the state institution "Palace of the Republic", the state news agency "BelTA", the Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus, BRSM, Belteleradiocompany, the National Library of Belarus, etc. were involved. Anna Lukashenko, wife of Dmitry, the middle son of Lukashenko Sr., headed the working group for the preparation and holding of the Marathon.
Despite the legal prohibition of campaigning activities in support of possible presidential candidates during this period, on 22 November Lukashenko visited Minsk State Linguistic University to hold there an "Open Microphone" meeting with students of humanitarian higher education institutions of the country[19].
On 7 December, A. Lukashenko attended the sports and entertainment show "Time of Our Victories" in Minsk Arena, which gathered seven thousand spectators. On the eve of the event the state mass media, at the suggestion of the press secretary of the Belarusian president N. Eismont, massively spread the narrative that the show was entirely Lukashenko's idea and merit[20]. The fact that the event was financed by state enterprises and "voluntary" donations of private commercial structures was deliberately concealed.
Under these conditions, the other four presidential candidates could only use the opportunity to present their election programmes and communicate with voters within the limits of the airtime provided on TV and radio. Traditionally, A. Lukashenko refused to participate in such campaign events, as well as did not take part in the televised debates of the presidential candidates.
None of Lukashenko's opponents in the election held any mass event with the participation of voters supporting them.
The period of appearances of the presidential candidates on TV and radio ended on 14 January. On the same day state newspapers published the election programmes of all five presidential candidates. A. Kanopatskaya proposed to switch to a parliamentary republic, limit the number of presidential terms, and carry out reforms. S. Syrankov stated that he was not “instead of, but together with Lukashenko” and announced "the inevitability of Lukashenko's victory". A. Khizhnyak spoke in favour of strengthening the state and increasing "the human resource potential of power structures". О. Gaidukevich suggested strengthening allied relations with Russia.
In his election programme, Lukashenko[21] frightened the audience with war, talked about plans to cooperate more with Russia and to make peace with the West, and identified NATO troops at the borders, pandemic, "unprecedented sanctions" and attempts to "undermine society from within" as the main challenges. In addition, Lukashenko paid much attention to the social sphere in his programme and promised:
to keep unchanged the principles of social policy in education and medicine, support for motherhood, childhood, the elderly and people with disabilities,
to make housing affordable, to maintain state support for the construction of housing for large families, orphans and other vulnerable categories of citizens,
to improve the quality of mobile communications and internet speeds, primarily through the active introduction of 5G technology,
to supplement the minimum social standards with comfort norms: every community should have access to transport, landscaped streets and recreation areas, high-speed internet, clean water, electricity and gas supplies, cultural, sports, trade and catering facilities.
The main features of the fourth phase of the campaign were:
absolutely unequal conditions for campaigning by presidential candidates,
the massive use of state resources by Lukashenko to increase his popularity,
inarticulate campaigning by all other candidates.
7. Analysis of the fifth phase (21–26 January 2025)
Start of early voting - main voting
On 21–25 January, early voting for the next presidential election was held in Belarus. The ballot paper contained the names of five candidates: A. Lukashenko, O. Gaidukevich, A. Kanopatskaya, S. Syrankov and A. Khizhnyak. According to the data provided by the CEC, during the early voting period there was a record turnout of citizens to the polling stations – 35,99 per cent of the number of voters[22].
On 26 January, the main day of voting in the presidential election took place. According to the CEC, by 12:00 the elections were already recognised as valid: the turnout was 56,64%[23]. According to the preliminary data of the CEC, the total turnout was 85,7 per cent of the total number of voters. At the same time, according to a special statement of the CEC, only 107 Belarusians living abroad took part in the voting[24], although according to some estimates the total number of citizens who left the country after 2020 is about a million people.
According to the exit poll conducted by BRSM, Lukashenko got 87,6 per cent of votes[25]. According to the preliminary data of the CEC, published at 11:00 on 27 January, Lukashenko won the presidential election with 86,82% of the total number of voters[26].
All Lukashenko's rivals got less than 5% of votes: Oleg Gaidukevich – 2,02%, Anna Kanopatskaya – 1,86%, Sergei Syrankov – 3,21%, Alexander Khizhnyak – 1,74%. 3,6% of voters voted against all[27].
The main features of the fifth phase of the campaign were:
record turnout for early voting,
active demonstration by Minsk (active participation of voters and a record number of votes) of alleged popular support for the incumbent president,
total control over the situation in Belarus using all resources of the national security system.
8. Conclusions and projections
The presidential elections held in the Republic of Belarus once again demonstrated the lack of aspiration of the state authorities to comply with the generally accepted democratic norms and principles. The main reason for this is A. Lukashenko's desire to keep the power in his hands at any cost.
That said, despite the unchanged goal, the current election campaign has been different in many ways from previous presidential elections, especially the 2020 election.
First, Lukashenko's election HQ has been considerably strengthened. It was engaged not only in campaigning, but also in the whole process of "election management". There was a clear strategy to ensure Lukashenko's victory, and the necessary human and financial resources were prepared and allocated for its implementation.
Second, the authorities have drawn conclusions from the events of 2020. They ensured quick, clear and well-coordinated actions of all elements of the state administration system. The most important officials of the country actively participated in the election in one role or another, providing support to A. Lukashenko.
Third, the national security system was prepared in advance for any scenarios and was the central element ensuring the success of the strategy of Lukashenko's election HQ. Large-scale repressions became an integral part of the preparation and conduct of election campaigns in order to intimidate civil society and prevent public protests.
Fourth, the Belarusian authorities have made significant efforts to conduct "sterile elections", in which internally all results and actions, including those of the opposition, were planned in advance and managed. The Belarusian authorities no longer allow any "games in democracy" and real alternative candidates. Their task is to demonstrate the complete non-alternativeness of A. Lukashenko.
Fifth, the Belarusian authorities made considerable efforts for the international recognition of the election results, which demonstrates a high degree of Lukashenko's interest in the foreign policy legitimisation of power and is an important warning to the West that the strategy of engaging in cooperation on Minsk's (and Moscow's) terms will continue in the future using increasingly sophisticated methods.
Sixth, the incumbent authorities have demonstrated their readiness and ability to use various non-standard forms and methods in their activities, which introduces a certain element of surprise into the further steps of official Minsk.
Seventh, from the first day of the election campaign, Moscow publicly supported Lukashenko's decision to run for a new presidential term, thus dispelling rumours about possible Russian attempts to interfere in the election campaign and prevent Lukashenko from running. At the moment, it is obvious that Moscow's strategy will be to wait for a convenient moment to interfere in the transit of power in Belarus in future.
The main reasons for the fact that the current presidential campaign in Belarus took place in full compliance with the desires of Minsk and Moscow were:
thorough and early preparation of the current government for the election campaign, application of non-standard methods and forms based on analyses and rethinking of the events of 2020,
total purging of the political field and destruction of the opposition "political infrastructure" inside the country,
lack of a clear strategy of the opposition abroad. The actions of S. Tikhanouskaya and her allies led to the fact that by 2025 she ceased to influence the domestic political field,
a smart use of the situation in the region by Belarusian authorities: against the background of the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine, official Minsk relied on the image of "Lukashenko as defender and guarantor of security", which enjoys support in Belarus,
lack of interference in the internal political situation during the election campaign period, both from the West and Russia.
All of the above allows us to conclude that the presidential election-2025 was the next stage of A. Lukashenko's consistent consolidation of power in Belarus after the 2020 protests.
However, this domestic political strategy, despite certain tactical successes, has long ago crossed the equator of its success and is rapidly leading Belarus to a serious demographic and, consequently, economic crisis. Further "sterilisation of the country" will lead not to the strengthening of popular support for A. Lukashenko, but to mass emigration, as it is happening, for example, in Venezuela.
The same applies to the foreign policy dimension of Lukashenko's activity, which will not undergo significant changes. In the near future, we should expect activation of Lukashenko's foreign lobbyists – former foreign ministers Sergei Martynov and Sergei Aleinik, as well as their contacts in Austria, Hungary, Slovakia and Germany (BSW, AfD and SPD parties), who will convince the West that the new, relatively "clean" elections should be recognised.
In addition, Lukashenko will try to use for his own purposes a part of the Belarusian opposition, which, against the background of a complete lack of ideas and demoralisation, can also be used as lobbyists for the legitimisation of the Belarusian president.
However, under the conditions when A. Lukashenko is in a military-political alliance with Russia and ensures Russian military presence on the border with three NATO countries, these actions have no chance of success. Thus, this strategic initiative of Lukashenko will be doomed to failure.
[1] https://belta.by/society/view/karpenko-objjasnil-chem-obosnovano-provedenie-vyborov-prezidenta-belarusi-26-janvarja-670217-2024/
[3] https://www.sb.by/articles/lukashenko-naznachil-natalyu-petkevich-pervym-zamestitelem-glavy-administratsii-prezidenta.html
[4] https://www.rec.gov.by/ru/from-telegram-ru/view/s-24-oktjabrja-po-1-nojabrja-2024-g-tsik-belarusi-osuschestvljaet-priem-dokumentov-dlja-registratsii-1930-2024
[5] https://belta.by/society/view/konsolidirovatsja-i-vystupat-edinym-frontom-patrioticheskie-sily-belarusi-o-vzaimodejstvii-vo-vremja-670447-2024/
[6] https://ex-press.live/rubrics/politika/2024/11/01/lukashenko-obyasnil-vydvizhenie-svoix-storonnikov-na-vyborax-zhelaniem-ego-obezopasit
[12] https://president.gov.by/ru/events/vstreca-s-rukovoditelem-i-koordinatorami-iniciativnoj-gruppy
[13] https://www.tvr.by/news/obshchestvo/elektoralnaya-kampaniya-v-belarusi-chto-podmechayut-chleny-initsiativnykh-grupp-vo-vremya-obscheniya-s-lyudmi
[19] https://president.gov.by/ru/events/vstreca-so-studentami-vuzov-v-formate-otkrytyj-mikrofon-s-prezidentom-v-mglu